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Abstract. In ﬁfth generation (5G) cloud radio access networks (C-RAN),
baseband processing of base stations (BS's) will be processed on virtual
machines called virtual BSs (VBS) in the centralized cloud architecture.
The existing researches mostly focus on how to maximize resource
utilization and reduce energy consumption in 5G C-RAN using VBS
placement. However, security issues in the context of VBS placement
within 5G C-RAN have been rarely addressed. In this paper, a security
aware VBS placement (SAV) scheme within 5G C-RAN is proposed
where the placement of VBSs to physical machines (PMs) considers
the security levels of both the VBS and the PM. A rigorous simulation
study is conducted for validating the proposed scheme, which shows a
signiﬁcant security improvement 16% compared to the heuristic simulated
scheme (HSA).
Key words: 5G, cloud computing, C-RAN, cloud security, virtual
machine placement.
1 Introduction
The ﬁfth generation (5G) cellular networks will experience a thousand-fold
increase in data traﬃc with over 100 billion connected devices by 2020 [1]. Such
surge in traﬃc will be from smart-phones, tablets, machine-machine connections
and the Internet of Things (IoT). In order to support this sky-rocketing traﬃc
demand, heterogeneous cloud radio access H-CRAN networks has been proposed
where macro remote radio heads (RRHs) are overlaid by smaller cell RRHs
like femto, pico, micro and relay to increase capacity using spatial frequency
reuse. The 5G C-RAN uses cloud computing virtualization techniques to host
BS function in virtual machines (VMs) called virtual basestation (BSs) (VBSs)
in the BS cloud [2]. One of the driving forces in the BS cloud is VBS placement
where VBS are migrated among physical machines (PMs) to maximise BS
resource utilization and reduce energy consumption. Nevertheless, security issues
in the BS cloud in C-RAN have been rarely addressed. The introduction of
running BS functions in PMs in the BS cloud brings about security issues.
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A prevalent VBS image with known vulnerabilities can be instantiated by an
attacker in BS cloud, therefore it may generate a large number of security
holes for attackers which may include eavesdropping users conversation. The
introduction of VBS images with known security vulnerabilities to a PM can
lead to security risks to the co-located VBSs in that PM. This is because
of the one to many mapping between the PM and the VBSs which makes
vulnerabilities propagate rapidly across the entire BS cloud. Some of the attacks
that an attacker can introduce include compromising the hypervisor and also
side channel attacks to the VBSs co-located within the same PM [3]. A VBS
that has been compromised can infect other VBS sharing the same hypervisor,
memory or CPU. When a VBS with no security risks is migrated to the PM
with a compromised VBS, that VBS will be compromised too. As such there is
need for a security aware VBS placement in the BS cloud to avoid the security
risks.
In this paper, a VBS and PM security evaluation based on their vulnerabilities
is ﬁrst conducted then, based on these security evaluations, a novel security aware
VSB placement is developed which minimises the security risks in the BS cloud.
The VBSs and PMs are grouped into vulnerability levels such that a VBS with
low vulnerability will be allocated to a PM with low vulnerability and a VBS
with high vulnerability will be allocated to a PM with high vulnerability. The
rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the related work
on VBS placement in C-RAN. The proposed security aware VBS placement
framework is described in details in Section 3. The results and discussions are
presented in Section 4. Then Finally the conclusions are presented in Section 5.
2 Related Work
Researchers have proposed several VBS placement strategies to improve resouce
utilization and improve energy consumption within 5G C-RAN. However, to
the best of our knowledge, there are no eﬀorts on VBS placement strategies
in 5G C-RAN to minimize the security risks for the BS cloud platform. The
author in [4] proposed a VBSs virtualization scheme that minimizes the power
consumption with a linear computational complexity order. The scheme is
based on a heuristic simulated annealing (HSA) algorithm, which combines a
bin packing algorithm with simulated annealing. Simulation results show that
the HSA eﬀectively decreases system power consumption when compared to
standard approaches. However, the simulated annealing VBS placement scheme
does not consider security in migration of VBSs. Authors in [5] proposed a
BBU reduction scheme for C-RAN that allocates VBSs to RRHs based on the
imbalance of subscribers in oﬃce/residential areas. A set of upper limit of VBS
utilization is deﬁned to avoid overloading of the VBS. However, the author
did not consider security in their VBS consolidation scheme. S. Namba et al.
in [6] proposed a baseband unit (BBU) reduction network architecture called
Colony-RAN due to its ability to ﬂexibly change cell layout by changing the
connections of BBUs and RRHs in respect to traﬃc demand. However, the
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proposed method has frequent ping pong reselections of RRH to BBU. The
author in [7] proposed a model for reducing power consumption in H-CRAN
by turning oﬀ the BBU in the cloud. However, the author assumes that all the
BBUs in the BS cloud operate at full load which is unrealistics. The author in [8]
proposed a VBS virtualization scheme that minimizes the power consumption
of the BS cloud. The VBS virtualization problem is formulated as a bin packing
problem, where each VBS is treated as a bin with ﬁnite computing expressed
in million Operations per Time Slot (MOPTS). The dynamics of the cell traﬃc
load is treated as an item that needs to be packed into the bins with the size
equal to the computing resources in MOPTS, required to support the traﬃc
load. Nevertheless, security has not been considered. Authors in [9] proposed a
C-RAN system using virtualization technology on general purpose processors
(GPPs) where BBUs are dynamically provisioned according to traﬃc load.
In [10], L. Cheng et al. developed an energy eﬃcient C-RAN system with a
reconﬁgurable backhaul that allows 4 BBUs to connect ﬂexibly with 4 RRHs
using radio-over-ﬁber technology. The backhaul architecture allows the mapping
between BBUs and RRHs to be ﬂexible and changed dynamically to reduce
energy consumption in the BBU pool. However, the paper assumes static user
traﬃc whereas in reality BS traﬃc is dynamic.
3 Proposed Security Aware VBS Placement (SAV)
3.1 System Model
The proposed architecture of SAV is shown in Fig. 1. The system comprise of
5G heterogeneous network which is made up of macro RRH overlaid by femto,
pico, micro and relay RRHs. The RRHs from the radio side are connected to the
BS cloud via high speed, low latency ﬁber cables. These connection is called the
fronthaul [2]. The fronthaul in the BS cloud is ﬁrst connected to the dispatcher
which route data to their respective VBSs within physical machines (PMs)
according to some VBS placement rules from the SAV module in the controller.
The SAV module in the controller contains the VBS placement framework which
will be explained in details in Section 3.3. The SAV takes all VBSs and PMs as
inputs and output the VSB-PM map. The BS cloud also comprise of the PMs
which host VBSs. The PMs contains hypervisors which runs on top of the PM
operating system (OS). The hypervisor is responsible for creating VBS on the
PMs. Each RRH has its own VBS.
3.2 VBS and PM Security Evaluation
The security evaluation procedure consists of evaluating the risks of both the
VBSs and PMs in the BS cloud.
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Fig. 1. The proposed SAV architecture.
VBS Security Evaluation: First, we quantify each VBS's vulnerabilities
based on the US National Vulnerability Database (NVD) [11], in which all
vulnerabilities called common vulnerability and exposures (CVE) are scored
according to the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) [3]. The NVD
is the repository which provides CVSS scores for all CVE vulnerabilities. At
present, NVD contains information about over 69,000 CVE vulnerabilities (as
of 04/27/2015) [3]. NVD was created by the government of United States to
help the Department of Homeland Security to warn public about common
computer vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities now include latest attacks on
cloud computing environments. The CVSS base score is the primary metric and
describes the severity of the vulnerability. The base score uses an interval scale
of (0, 10) to measure the severity of vulnerabilities.
First a check is perfomed with NVD to collect potential vulnerabilities in the
VBSs. Vulnerability scanner tools, such as, Nessus and Qualys are available
to conduct this job. Since it is possible for a VBS to have more than one
vulnerabilities, it is usually desirable to aggregate the scores of individual
vulnerabilities for each VBS. The VBS vulnerability can be divided into three
descrete levels: low compromise, medium compromise and high compromise.
Suppose the collected vulnerabilities of all the VBSs within PMi are stored
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in the set VPMi = {Vj |j = 1, 2, ...n}. Then the compromise level of a V BSj
denoted CV BSj can be given as:
CV BSj =
Vj∑n
m=1 Vm
(1)
Physical Machine Security Evaluation: The VBS compromise level has
been computed. Next the probability of survivability for each PM is computed
based on the compromise level (CV BSj ) of each hosted VBS. The survivability
probability is the possibility that all owned VBSs of a PM can survive during
the attacks in one or more of the VBSs. If any of the VBSs in the PM is
compromised, then the PM will also be compromised with high probability.
Given the compromise level of all VBSs in PMi as {CV BS1 , CV BS2 , ..., CV BSn},
then the survivability score for PMi denoted as SPMi is given as:
SPMi =
n∏
m=1
(1− CV BSj ) (2)
The survivability quantiﬁes the PM security level which correspond to three
discrete states: low survivability, medium survivability and high survivability.
Next the VBS placement based on the VBS and PM security levels is described
in the next section.
3.3 The SAV Framework
From the previous discussions, we can learn that the success of attacks highly
depends on the placement strategy of the cloud. Thus, our approach is to ﬁnd a
systematic solution to place VBSs into PMs which can reduce security risks in
the BS cloud. If a VBS has low compromise, it will be infeasible to place it on
a PM with low survivability. Also, if a PM is of high survivability, it would be
infeasible to place a VBSs with high compromise which may results in a negative
survivability impacts on the PM. In the proposed SAV scheme, the compromise
level of the VBS and the survivability of the PM are taken into consideration
when performing VBS placement. In SAV, it will be reasonable to place a VBS
of low compromise level to a PM with high survivability. Also, in SAV, the VBSs
are placed to PMs such that the CV BSj state match the SPMi state as follows:
i) A low compromise VBS is placed on high survivability PM
ii) A medium compromise VBS is placed on medium survivability PM
iii) A high compromise VBS is placed on low survivability PM
Fig. 2 shows the ﬂowchart of how the proposed SAV scheme operate. The
input to the SAV scheme is all the VBSs and all the PMs in the BS cloud. First
for every VBS, the security evaluation is performed by computing the comprise
level of each VBS using equation (1). Then the compromise level (CV BSj ) is used
for calculating survivability of each PM (SPMi). A test is then performed on each
VBS to check whether the compromise state of that VBS match the survivability
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Fig. 2. The ﬂowchart of SAV framework.
of the PM. If not, then all the other VBS compromise levels are checked and if
they match the PM survavibility state, the VBS is then allocated to the PM.
The process will continue untill all VBSs are allocated to PMs securely.
4 Results and Discussion
To analyse the proposed SAV framework, a 2 tier H-CRAN long term evolution
(LTE) layout is considered where macro RRHs are overlaid by small cells RRHs.
Up to 200 RRHs are considered and each RRH has its own VBS in the BS cloud.
As explained before, to the best of our knowledge, there are no security aware
VBS placement schemes in 5G C-RAN at the moment, this paper is the ﬁrst
to proposed such framework. Therefore, the proposed SAV will be compared
with the HSA scheme in [4] which consider VBS placement for saving energy
consumption in the BS cloud without considering security. Fig. 3 shows the
eﬀects of increasing the number of VBSs in the network on the PM survivability
for all the schemes. For both the proposed SAV scheme and the HSA schemes,
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Fig. 3. The eﬀects of VBS variation on PM survivability.
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
Po
w
er
 C
o
n
su
m
p
ti
o
n
 (
K
W
)
Number of VBSs
SAV
HAS
Fig. 4. The eﬀects of VBS variation on power consumption.
as the number of VBSs in the BS cloud increases, the PM survivability decreases
because the chances of comprimised VBSs are higher with the increase of VBSs.
Also it can be observed in the diagram than the SAV scheme performs better than
the HSA scheme by 16% with high chances of survivability of an average of 0.65
compared to the HSA scheme with chances of survivability of 0.5. This is because
the SAV scheme considers security of VBSs and PMs before performing the VBS
placement. Fig. 4 shows the eﬀects of varying the number of VBSs on the power
consumption in the BS cloud. For both the schemes, as the number of VBSs
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increases, the power consumption also increases as more VBSs requires more
PMs which will consume more power. On average, the SAV scheme consumes
15% more energy compared to the HSA scheme. This is because, even though
the SAV scheme provide some security beneﬁts, this results in the penalty of
more power of 15% being consumed by the SAV scheme as a results of the VBS
placement scheme security overheads which requires more PMs to be deployed.
5 Conclusion
The existing researches mostly focus on how to maximize resource utilization and
reduce energy consumption in ﬁfth generation (5G) cloud radio access networks
(C-RAN) using virtual base station (VBS) placement. However, security issues
in the context of VBS placement within 5G C-RAN have been rarely addressed.
In this paper, a security aware VBS placement (SAV) scheme is proposed where
the placement of VBSs to physical machines (PMs) considers the security levels
of both the VBS and the PM. A rigorous simulation study is conducted for
validating the proposed scheme, which shows a signiﬁcant security improvement
since the proposed SAV scheme outperforms the heuristic simulated scheme
(HSA) by 16% with power consumption penalty of 15%.
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